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Abstract
This paper argues (following Gould, 2003) that the disappearance of the .400
hitter in major league baseball is due, not to a decrease in ability at the top end
of the talent distribution, but to better methods of screening out players at the
low end of the distribution. The argument is related to the economic literature on
minimum quality standards in markets with imperfect information.
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1Minimum Quality Standards in Baseball and
the Paradoxical Disappearance of the .400 Hitter
In 1941, Ted Williams batted .406, thus accomplishing for the final time a feat
that was once relatively common in major league baseball.  By the time “Teddy
Ballgame” surpassed the mark, .400 hitters had already become rare.  As Table 1 shows,
22 of the 35 times a hitter has batted .400 or better occurred before the turn of the
century, and, prior to Williams, no one had done it since 1930.
Several explanations have been offered for this trend.  The first is that players
were simply better back then (“There were giants in those days.”)  This explanation,
however, is based more on nostalgia than any firm evidence.  The fact is that the league
batting average has remained remarkably stable throughout the history of baseball.
Referring again to Table 1, note that the league average from 1876-1890--a period when
twelve players batted over .400—was .259, exactly the same as it was for the decade of
the 1980’s, and lower than it was for the 1990’s.  But beyond the numbers, it is simply
implausible to argue that today’s exquisitely conditioned and trained players are inferior
to their counterparts from a century ago, not to mention the greatly increased pool of
talent that became available with the influx of Latin and black players, which occurred
after the last .400 hitter.
Two other explanations are based on changing strategies of the game.1  The first
is that the style of play after about 1920 (when Babe Ruth first appeared on the scene)
began to emphasize power over high batting averages, bunting, and stolen bases.  The
second is the specialization of relief pitching, which occurred around the same time and
                                                          
1 See Felber and Gillette (2001: pp. 95-96).
2confronted hitters in late innings with top-flight pitchers rather than tiring starters or
mop-up men.  While these explanations are more plausible, they still do not explain why
the league average has remained steady while extreme performances have disappeared.
Stephen Jay Gould (2003, pp. 151-173) has offered a different kind of explanation
for the “extinction” of the .400 hitter based on an analogy to biological evolution.  He
argues that the downward trend in maximum averages, accompanied by a corresponding
increase in minimum averages, reflects a general decrease in variation in averages around
a stable mean as the game has matured and methods of play have became standardized.
According to this interpretation, .400 averages were in effect “outliers” in the overall
distribution of averages, and disappeared as the variance of the distribution decreased.
Gould (2003, p. 163) summarizes his argument as follows:
Variation in batting average must decrease as improving play eliminates the rough
edges that great players can exploit, and as average play moves toward the limits
of human possibility and compresses great players into an ever decreasing space
between average play and the immovable [limit of human capacity].
Zimbalist (1992, p. 144) has advanced a similar argument:
The fact that a smaller proportion of a more athletically talented population is
playing baseball produces…compression of talent at the top end.  The variation
among players in performance statistics has narrowed steadily over the years.…
Today’s top sluggers face fewer weak pitchers and more excellent hurlers with a
broad array of dazzling pitches than did Babe Ruth, Jimmy Foxx, and Hank
Greenberg….
Another way to say this is that the “technology” of baseball has changed in such a
way as to eliminate the lower tail of the talent distribution.  This has occurred through
better scouting, better coaching, better equipment, and better conditioning of players. The
fact that there has not been a concomitant increase in league averages as a result of these
changes is due to the conscious and ongoing efforts of baseball rulemakers to maintain a
3constant balance between hitters and pitchers, for example by adjusting the height of the
pitching mound and altering the definition of the strike zone (Gould, 2003, p. 157).  What
has happened, however, is the disappearance of extreme performances.  Thus, Gould
(2003, p. 163) concludes that “The extinction of .400 hitting is, paradoxically, a mark of
increasingly better play” [emphasis in original].
It is instructive to draw an analogy between Gould’s argument and the economic
literature on efforts to establish minimum quality standards in markets for goods of
uncertain quality (Akerlof, 1970).  For example, Leland (1979) has argued that
government licensing of certain professions is intended to improve the average quality of
these professions by preventing entry of low ability practitioners.  In the baseball context,
owners and managers have similarly developed an extensive system of scouting, training,
and evaluation of young players to ensure that only the most promising make it to the
major leagues. As these methods have improved, the minimum ability of those players
who make it has correspondingly increased (holding fixed the total size of rosters).  And,
according to Gould’s argument, this has had the paradoxical effect of lowering the
maximum performance of the best players, assuming that the ability of the best players
has not changed over time.  As a result, the observed decrease in high averages is a
consequence of successful truncation at the low end of the ability distribution.
To see this formally, suppose, following Leland (1979), that players’ abilities are
indexed by q, with higher q indicating higher ability. Further, suppose that abilities are
distributed according to the distribution function F(q) with density f(q).  Let
qL = lowest ability level in the league;
qH = highest ability level in the league.
4The average ability in the league at any point in time is thus given by
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I assume that qH is fixed and remains constant over time, but that qL can be increased by
the development and use of better screening methods.  Differentiating qA shows that the
average ability in the league is increasing in qL:
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To make this analysis compatible with Gould’s argument, we need to incorporate
the fact that a player’s measured performance depends not on his absolute ability but on
his ability relative to the average ability in the league.  This reflects the fact that
measured performance in baseball describes relative rather than absolute performance in
a competitive setting, one that pits players against each other rather than against an
absolute measure like the clock.2 To capture this, we assume that the batting average of a
player of ability q is a positive function of the ratio q/qA.  Thus, variations in the
maximum batting average should depend on variations in the ratio qH/qA.  Given this
specification, it follows immediately from (2) that if qH remains fixed over time (i.e., if
the ability of the best players does not change), but improved screening succeeds in
raising qL, then the maximum average should fall.3
                                                          
2 Thus, for example, swimming and running times have steadily fallen over time, in contrast to the
constancy of batting averages in baseball.
3 Note that the performance of the average player is normalized to one, and hence held constant, in this
formulation.  Further, if the distribution of q is fairly uniform, then qL/qA will rise with qL, thereby
improving the performance of the worst players.  Gould (2003, p. 168) provides some evidence for this
5There are at least three ways that screening has improved over the history of
baseball: improvements in scouting, expansion and improvement of the minor league
system, and, more recently, increasing reliance on college baseball as a training ground
for major leaguers (a change which has partially reduced the need to rely on the minors
(Shughart and Goff, 1992)).  Based on the Gould’s theory, these factors have worked in
the direction of reducing extreme performances, while improving the overall quality of
play (i.e., qA has gone up, causing qH/qA to go down).
Two factors that work in the opposite direction are expansion, which lowers qL
(and hence qA) because of the need to add more players to major league rosters; and
performance-enhancing drugs like steroids, which increase the attainable level of human
performance (thereby increasing qH).  Both of these factors will therefore tend to increase
the frequency of extreme performances.  Based on this logic, Zimbalist (1992, p. 144)
observed that “One salutary effect of expansion would be more approaches to
[longstanding] records.”  His prediction has certainly proved prophetic (at least regarding
home run records), but recent events suggest that this power surge has been more due to
steroids than to the dilution of talent from expansion.
                                                                                                                                                                            
effect which, combined with the lowering of the performances of the best players, reduces the variance of
overall performance.
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7Table 1
     League Batting Average and Number of .400 Hitters,
by decade, 1876-2000
Decade League Avg. # of .400 Hitters
_____________________________________
1876-1890      .259      12
1891-1900      .280      10
1901-1910      .253        1
1911-1920      .259                   4
1921-1930      .288        7
1931-1940      .277        0
1941-1950      .261        1
1951-1960      .259           0
1961-1970      .250        0
1971-1980      .258        0
1981-1990      .259        0
1991-2000      .266        0
_____________________________________
Source: Calculations by the author using data from J. Thorn, P. Palmer,
and M. Gershman (Eds.), Total Baseball, 7th Edition. Kingston, NY:
Total Sports Publishing (2001).
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